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ABSTRACT 
Discussions of economic reform focus on two strategies for tempering 
corporate excess and mobilizing corporations for growth and prosperi-
ty: restructuring markets via competition policies and various forms of 
countervailing power. Populists, Progressives, and New Dealers looked 
to anti-trust, regulatory states, and unions as counterweights to corpora-
tions. Contemporary efforts look to not-for-profit watchdogs, NGO cer-
tification and standard setting, privatization, and corporate governance 
reform to upgrade markets and deflect corporations from low road 
paths. This essay recovers a third strategy for regulating and reforming 
corporate capitalism: promoting organizational diversity via the forma-
tion of parallel systems of cooperative, mutual and local, state-owned 
enterprises. During the “era of corporate consolidation,” producer and 
consumer groups in the US formed tens of thousands of such enterpris-
es in just in agriculture, but also in banking, insurance, and technologi-
cally advanced industries like electricity and telephones. These efforts 
produced enduring systems of cooperatives and kindred enterprise in 
the American economy, creating alternatives to corporations and orga-
nizational legacies for present day problem solving. They provided 
regulators and policy makers with new options and capacities for state 
intervention. And they demonstrated possibilities for using mixed or-
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ganizational systems to discipline firms, create and upgrade markets, 
foster competition, and otherwise solve vexing problems of economic 
development. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Discussions of revitalization and economic reform commonly focus 
on two strategies for tempering corporate excess and mobilizing corpora-
tions for development, growth, and prosperity: restructuring markets via 
competition policies and various forms of countervailing power. Progres-
sive and New Deal reformers looked to the state and unions as the key 
counterweights to corporations. They viewed regulation by independent 
commission, trustbusting, social welfare policy, and collective bargain-
ing as ways to rationalize capitalism, induce investments in productivity, 
and foster a more broadly shared prosperity.1 More recent efforts to 
reform corporations look to not-for-profit watchdogs, nongovernmental 
certification and standard setting, privatization, and corporate gover-
nance as ways to harness the “market forces” of shareholder activism and 
informed consumer choice to upgrade corporate capitalism.2 Based on 
historical analyses of organizational form in American infrastructure in-
dustries, this Article recovers a third strategy for contesting, regulating, 
and reforming corporations: promoting organizational diversity in the 
economy via the formation of parallel systems of cooperative, mutual, 
and local, state-owned enterprises. The logic of this strategy is to work 
around, complement, compete with, and even displace corporations by 
fostering self-organization among producers and consumers, and by 
                                                        
 1. See generally GERALD BERK, ALTERNATIVE TRACKS: THE CONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC ORDER, 1865–1917 (1994); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE 
CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952); THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 
(1984); MICHEAL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE (1984); 
ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1877–
1917 (1999); Philippe C. Schmitter, Corporatism is Dead! Long Live Corporatism!, 24 GOV’T & 
OPPOSITION 54 (1989); Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Organizations, Regulation, and Economic 
Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Forms from the 19th to 21st Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 31 (2008). 
 2. See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND 
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007); Bruce Kogut & J. Muir Macpherson, The Decision to Privat-
ize: Economists and the Construction of Ideas and Policies, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF 
MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 104 (Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett eds., 2007); 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION (Marie-Laure Djelic 
& Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006); Timothy Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of 
Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Condi-
tions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 297 (2007); Catherine Daily, Dan Dalton & Albert Cannella Jr., Corporate 
Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 371 (2003); Wendy N. Espel-
and & Michael Sauder, Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds, 113 
AM. J. SOC. 1 (2007); Andrei Shliefer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 
J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
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creating enterprises that are structured for different purposes and consti-
tuencies. 
Organizations scholars and law and economics researchers have 
probed the importance of legal, organizational, and ownership form for 
the operation and behavior of firms.3 By eliminating independent share-
holders and assigning authority and residual claims to consumers, pro-
ducers, or peer groups of professionals, cooperatives and related alterna-
tives to “investor-owned” corporations alter the relations and incentives 
among stakeholders within firms, creating possibilities for investments 
and activity that might not otherwise occur. Yet between pursuing histor-
ical–comparative analyses of capitalism and focusing on perfecting mar-
kets and corporations, academic and policy discussions often view coop-
erative and state enterprises as relics of small-town worlds now lost, arti-
facts of idiosyncratic conditions, or utopian experiments briefly revived 
in the 1960s, but ultimately swept aside by the triumph of the modern, 
and now global, corporation. Indeed, analysts across subfields commonly 
describe the rise and changing structure of the corporation as the central 
acts in the drama of U.S. economic development.4 
                                                        
 3. For economics of organization approaches, see, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, OWNERSHIP OF 
ENTERPRISE (1996); THE STUDY OF NON-PROFIT ENTERPRISE: THEORIES AND APPROACHES (Hel-
mut K. Anheier & Avner Ben-Ner eds., 2003); Avner Ben-Ner, On the Stability of the Cooperative 
Type of Organization, 8 J. COMP. ECON. 247 (1984); Louis Putterman, Some Behavioral Perspec-
tives on the Dominance of Hierarchical over Democratic Forms of Enterprise, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 139 (1982); Eric Rasmussen, Mutual Banks and Stock Banks, 31 J. L. & ECON. 395 (1988). For 
professional-owned enterprises, see Ronald Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human 
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985); Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, Profit Sharing and the Role of Profes-
sional Partnerships, Q. J. ECON. 131 (2005). For organizational studies, see Raymond Russell & 
Robert Hanneman, The Formation and Dissolution of Worker Cooperatives in Israel, 1924–1992, in 
UTOPIA IN ZION: THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE WITH WORKER COOPERATIVES 57–95 (R. Russell ed., 
1995); Howard Aldrich & Robert N. Stern, Resource Mobilization and the Creation of US Producer 
Cooperatives, 1835–1935, 4 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 371 (1983); Paul Ingram & Tal Simons, 
State Formation, Ideological Competition, and the Ecology of Israeli Workers’ Cooperatives, 1920–
1992, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 25 (2000); Marc Schneiberg, Marissa King & Thomas Smith, Social 
Movements and Organizational Form: Cooperative Alternatives to Corporation in the American 
Insurance, Dairy and Grain Industries, 73 AMER. SOC. REV. 635 (2008); Udo Staber, Organization-
al Foundings in the Cooperative Sector of Atlantic Canada: An Ecological Perspective, 10 
ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 381 (1989). 
 4. Narratives often invoke the necessities of industrialization and globalization, the technical 
superiority of the corporate form, or how ruthlessly corporations drove alternatives from the stage to 
define the core logic of the American system. See BERK, supra note 1; ADOLF A. BERLE & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Pubs. 
1991) (1932); ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1993); FRANK DOBBIN, FORGING INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE UNITED STATES, 
BRITAIN AND FRANCE IN THE RAILWAY AGE (1994); COLEEN A. DUNLAVY, POLITICS AND 
INDUSTRIALIZATION: EARLY RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA (1994); JOHN 
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (Princeton Univ. Press 2007) (1967); NEIL 
FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATION CONTROL (1990). 
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Such a vision too narrowly construes both the scope of these enter-
prises and the possibilities for using mixed organizational systems for 
revitalization and reform. During the “era of corporate consolidation,” 
producer and consumer groups in the United States formed tens of thou-
sands of cooperative, mutual, and local state enterprises not just in agri-
culture, but also in banking, insurance, and technologically advanced 
industries like electricity and telephones.5 Producers and consumers or-
ganized such enterprises locally to solve immediate economic problems: 
to gain access to vital goods and markets, to bypass or counterbalance 
corporate combinations, and to support investments in quality and im-
provement. Yet anticorporate and reform movements also made coopera-
tive forms centerpieces of broader efforts to contest corporate consolida-
tion and to foster more decentralized, small stakeholder capitalisms of 
independent producers, farmers, and self-governing market towns. And 
as state and federal regulators struggled to rationalize American capital-
ism, they too drew on cooperatives, mutuals, and state firms, mobilizing 
them to regulate corporations, promote new forms of competition, and 
foster regional development. In so doing, Populists, Progressive refor-
mers, and New Dealers not only established systems of cooperatives and 
kindred enterprise as parallel organizational paths within the American 
economy, making these forms available for present day efforts. They also 
demonstrated possibilities for using mixed organizational systems to dis-
cipline firms, create and upgrade markets, and solve vexing problems of 
development and economic infrastructure. 
This Article first traces the evolution and scope of these systems, 
establishing them as durable and important elements of American corpo-
rate capitalism, rather than trivial remnants of a bygone era. It then 
presents case studies of how various groups used these systems to con-
front, transform, or bypass corporations and markets. Organizers and 
public officials turned to cooperative and public enterprise to do things 
corporations would not or could not do—to foster more balanced eco-
nomic development, sustain investments in improvement, and expand 
states’ regulatory capacities. 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM:  
A SELECTIVE OVERVIEW 
While cast as the “era of corporate capitalism,” the 1870s through 
the 1950s was also an era in which cooperative, mutual, and state enter-
                                                        
 5. For an overview, see Marc Schneiberg, What’s on the Path? Path Dependence, Organiza-
tional Diversity and the Problem of Institutional Change in the US Economy, 1900–1950, 5 SOCIO-
ECON. REV. 47 (2007); see also Schneiberg et al., supra note 3. 
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prises emerged and endured in a surprising range of American industries. 
The best-known cases are producer-owned firms (or co-ops) in agricul-
ture. These included grain elevator cooperatives, fruit processing cooper-
atives, and various forms of dairy businesses. Producer co-ops rapidly 
became the central, and in some subsectors the dominant, form of orga-
nizational structure.6 Growers also organized cooperative firms as buyers 
to purchase farm implements and other inputs, as did consumers, creating 
food co-ops that incorporated elements of worker cooperatives. Histori-
cally, cooperatives in grain and dairy—the two agricultural sectors I 
study most closely—first appeared in the Northeast and Midwest in the 
1840s and 1850s.7 Grain elevator cooperatives spread south and west 
from the Midwest in two waves between the 1870s and 1920s, the period 
in which dairymen formed creamery, cheese, and milk marketing coop-
eratives in their greatest numbers. Together, the two groups organized 
nearly 6,000 cooperatives by the end of the 1920s, and the institutionali-
zation of this form in agriculture in the 1920s and 1930s made agricul-
tural cooperatives and their federations household names: Riceland, Land 
O’ Lakes, Tillamook Cheese, Humbolt Cream, Sunkist, Sunmaid, 
Oceanspray, and Blue Diamond.8 
Less familiar, but perhaps even more important, are cooperatives 
and mutuals in the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) industries, 
including property insurance mutuals, fraternal life insurers, mutual 
banks, credit unions, and even housing cooperatives. These are all con-
sumer-owned firms, although “consumers” and organizers in many cases 
are businesses, factories, and farms, as well as individuals. Like agricul-
                                                        
 6. See WARD W. FETROW & R.H. ELSWORTH, AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1947); RICHARD B. HEFLEBOWER, COOPERATIVES AND MUTUALS IN THE MARKET SYSTEM 
(1980); JOSEPH KNAPP, THE RISE OF AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE: 1620–1920 (1969); 
GEORGE HAROLD POWELL, COOPERATION IN AGRICULTURE (1921); Elizabeth Hoffman & Gary 
Libecap, Institutional Choice and the Development of U.S. Agricultural Policies in the 1920s, 51 J. 
ECON. HIST. 397 (1991). 
 7. See FETROW & ELSWORTH, supra note 6; HEFLEBOWER, supra note 6; KNAPP, supra note 6; 
ERIC E. LAMPARD, THE RISE OF THE DAIRY INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN: A STUDY IN AGRICULTURAL 
CHANGE, 1820–1920 (1963); Brigitte Young, The Dairy Industry: From Yeomanry to the Institutio-
nalization of Multilateral Governance, in GOVERNANCE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 236 (John L. 
Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Leon N. Lindberg eds., 1991); Oscar Refsell, The Farmers’ 
Elevator Movement, 22 J. POL. ECON. 872 (1914) [hereinafter Refsell, Elevator Movement]; Oscar 
Refsell, The Farmers’ Elevator Movement II, 22 J. POL. ECON. 969 (1914) [hereinafter Refsell, 
Elevator Movement II]; Bob Croff & Truman Graff, The History and Role of Dairy Cooperatives, 
UNIV. OF WIS. CTR. FOR COOPERATIVES (Jan. 2001), www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/dairy/history.pdf. 
 8. See HEFLEBOWER, supra note 6; Hoffman & Libecap, supra note 6; R.H. ELSWORTH, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS, MARKETING AND PURCHASING, 
1925, at 77 (1928) [hereinafter ELSWORTH, AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES]; R.H. ELSWORTH, U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., COOPERATIVE MARKETING AND PURCHASING, 1920–1930, at 3 (1930) [hereinaf-
ter ELSWORTH, COOPERATIVE PURCHASING]. The USDA tallied a total of 12,000 agricultural coop-
eratives in operation in 1930. ELSWORTH, COOPERATIVE PURCHASING, supra, at 3. 
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tural cooperatives, property insurance mutuals predated the Civil War, 
and proliferated in a veritable tidal wave between 1870 and 1910. At 
least 3,500 insurance mutuals were organized in that period, writing 
11%–12% of the total value of property insurance—or insurance in 
force—and capturing certain lines and regions by the 1920s, including 
commercial insurance for textile and flour mills, the farm business (40% 
market share), and states like Wisconsin (35%).9 For better or worse, mu-
tuals also dominated residential mortgage markets through the 1970s. 
There were over 4,000 mutual savings associations representing 85% of 
thrifts and 90% of thrift industry assets operating in 1975, on the eve of 
deregulation and financialization.10 Those changes notwithstanding, over 
7,700 credit unions currently operate in the United States, with over 91 
million or 44% of the economically active population as members.11 
Cooperative, mutual, and state enterprises even played central roles 
in technologically advanced “network” sectors in the form of telephone 
mutuals, cooperative and state-owned enterprises in electricity, and mu-
nicipal gas and water companies. Numbering as many as 18,000 in 1907, 
telephone mutuals operating local exchanges and tiny cooperatively 
owned “farmers’ lines” dominated rural markets in the early twentieth 
century. Many persist today, although mutuals now play a small overall 
role in telecom.12 In electricity, however, both state-owned enterprise and 
cooperatives continue to play a surprisingly substantial role. In the early 
twentieth century, municipal electrical utilities proliferated alongside 
investor-owned utilities (IOUs), reaching nearly 3,000 by 1922. After a 
withering counterattack by IOUs, the number of municipals in the United 
States fell to 1,800 by 1932, but then recovered during the New Deal era, 
stabilizing in numbers in the 1940s. Roughly 2,000 still operate today, 
not just in small Midwestern cities, but also in urban centers like Los 
                                                        
 9. See JOHN BAINBRIDGE, BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA, THE STORY OF MUTUAL FIRE AND 
CASUALTY INSURANCE (1952); HEFLEBOWER, supra note 6; Marc Schneiberg, Organizational Hete-
rogeneity and the Production of New Forms: Politics, Social Movements and Mutual Companies in 
American Fire Insurance, 1900–1930, 19 RES. SOC. ORG. 39 (2002). 
 10. See Richard Masulis, Changes in Ownership Structure: Conversion of Mutual Savings and 
Loan to Stock Charter, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 34 (1987); OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, 2005 FACT BOOK: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE THRIFT INDUSTRY (Apr. 2006), 
available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/2005FactBook.pdf. 
 11. WORLD COUNCIL OF CREDIT UNIONS, 2009 STATISTICAL REPORT: CREDIT UNIONS 
WORLDWIDE, http://www.woccu.org/publications/statreport (last updated Dec. 31, 2009). 
 12. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPHS 
1902 (1906) [hereinafter TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPHS]; DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, BUREAU 
OF THE CENSUS, TELEPHONES: 1907 (1910); William Barnett & Glenn Carroll, Competition and 
Mutualism among Early Telephone Companies, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 400 (1987); Claude Fischer, The 
Revolution in Rural Telephony, 1900–1920, 21 J. SOC. HIST. 5 (1987); CLAUDE S. FISCHER, 
AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO 1940 (1992). 
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Angeles, Seattle, San Antonio, and Memphis.13 Electrical cooperatives 
also emerged in force during the New Deal, yielding by the late 1940s a 
system of over 950 such enterprises that also still operate today. Each of 
these systems has delivered steadily growing volumes of electricity to 
steadily growing numbers of consumers. Together, municipals and elec-
trical cooperatives currently serve nearly 87 million customers, or rough-
ly 27% of consumers served by all utilities (and 26% of the kilowatt 
hours), supported in part by large-scale, federal power-generating 
projects, including TVA, Bonneville, and Parker Canyon.14 
The accompanying figure and table, and multivariate analyses of 
cooperative enterprises, shed light on both these firms’ distribution 
across regions, and the conditions that support them. As the maps in the 
figure reveal, there is pronounced regionalism in the evolution and re-
sulting density of cooperative, mutual, and local state enterprises.15 This 
pattern persists even when the size of states and geographical distribution 
of the industries involved are taken into account. Cooperative forms 
emerged first and most heavily in upper Midwestern states like Wiscon-
sin, Minnesota, and Illinois (but also in upstate New York and rural 
Pennsylvania). They continued to proliferate in the upper Midwest as 
organizers pursued cooperative and related forms in other industries, 
spreading into the Plains, West, and then South through the first half of 
the twentieth century. 
   
                                                        
 13. The American Public Power Association provides annual data on U.S. municipal electrical 
utilities and electrical cooperatives, including numbers, customers, and sales figures. See, e.g., 
AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC POWER, APPA ANNUAL DIRECTORY & 
STATISTICAL REPORT (1982); AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC POWER, APPA 
ANNUAL DIRECTORY & STATISTICAL REPORT, 20, 22 (2011–2012) [hereinafter APPA DIRECTORY 
2011–12]; see also RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN., STATISTICAL REPORTS, RURAL ELECTRIC 
BORROWERS (1936–1979); RURAL UTILITIES SERV., STATISTICAL REPORTS, RURAL ELECTRIC 
BORROWERS (1980–1992). 
 14. APPA DIRECTORY 2011–12, supra note 13, at 22, 24. 
 15. The maps provide the numbers, per state, of cooperative, mutual, or state-owned enterpris-
es in successive periods as they emerged in different sectors. Data presented in the maps and table on 
the number of insurance mutuals per state were compiled by the author as described in Schneiberg, 
supra note 9, at 67. For data on telephone mutuals per state, see TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPHS, 
supra note 12. Data on dairy and grain elevator cooperatives per state were collected as described in 
Schneiberg et al., supra note 3, at 645. For data on municipal utilities per state, see DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES, CENTRAL ELECTRIC 
LIGHT AND POWER STATIONS: 1922, at 72–73 (1925). Data for electrical cooperatives per state were 
compiled by the author from RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN., 1941 STATISTICAL REPORTS, RURAL 
ELECTRIC BORROWERS (1942); RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN., 1947 STATISTICAL REPORTS, 
RURAL ELECTRIC BORROWERS (1948). Data on the number of state credit unions per state were 
compiled by the author using data from Credit Union National Association, Long-Run Trends (1939 
To Present: Aggregates), CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N, http://www.cuna.org/econ/long_run.html 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2011). 
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The table of pair-wise correlations among the counts, per state, of 
seven different enterprise forms likewise reveals this pronounced regio-
nalism. Successive waves of organization occurred in many of the same 
places despite shifting geographies of development and varied industries 
and technologies. Groups organized dairy and grain cooperatives most 
heavily in places where insurance and telephone mutuals were best-
established; they turned to municipal electrical utilities most extensively 
in places with the densest concentrations of mutuals and agricultural co-
operatives; they embraced electrical cooperatives and state credit unions 
most forcefully in places with the greatest numbers of already existing 
mutuals, cooperatives, and municipal firms. Over the course of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, producers and consumers did 
not just organize isolated or scattered enterprise alternatives to corpora-
tions. To the contrary, they produced correlated systems of organization-
al diversity, generating dense and overlapping ecologies of cooperative 
and related forms in certain regions—and market shares reaching three 
and four times the national figures.16 
Qualitative and multivariate analyses also indicate that these corre-
lated systems of enterprise are themselves correlated with the character 
of local communities, broader anticorporate and reform movements, and 
self-reinforcing processes of organizational interlocking. Cooperative 
forms emerged and endured most extensively in stable and homogenous 
communities; in places with histories of extensive Scandinavian and 
German immigration; and in communities rich in traditional, producerist 
or cross-class associations like bowling clubs, labor unions, and local 
newspapers. During the early twentieth century, standard deviation in-
creases in population stability and percent foreign-born whites, respec-
tively, increased the densities of cooperatives and mutuals by 22% to 
50% and by 43% to 93%, net of economic and political conditions.17 
 
   
                                                        
 16. By 1990, municipals and cooperatives combined served over 26% of electricity customers 
in Texas and Florida, 34% and 35% in Kansas and Nebraska, respectively, 39% in Minnesota, and 
43% in Georgia. Calculations by author using data from EDISON ELEC. INST., 1990 STATISTICS OF 
NON-INVESTOR OWNED UTILITIES 13, 22 (1990); EDISON ELEC. INST., HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF 
THE ELECTRICAL UTILITY INDUSTRY THROUGH 1992, at 391 (1995). According to the American 
Public Power Association, over 21% of California’s residential customers, 36% of Arizona’s, 50% 
of Washington’s, nearly 69% of Tennessee’s, and over 98% of Nebraska’s residential customers 
received their electricity just from public power sources in 2008. APPA DIRECTORY 2011–12, supra 
note 13, at 42. 
 17. Schneiberg et al., supra note 3, at 655. 
2011] Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism? 1419 
E 
C
oo
ps
 
      
1.
00
00
 
St
at
e 
C
U
s 
     
1.
00
00
 
0.
47
56
 
M
un
ic
ip
al
s 
    
1.
00
00
 
0.
43
35
 
0.
58
75
 
G
ra
in
 
   
1.
00
00
 
0.
58
96
 
0.
35
34
 
0.
37
23
 
D
ai
ry
 
  
1.
00
00
 
0.
54
09
 
0.
39
00
 
0.
48
31
 
0.
42
90
 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
 
1.
00
00
 
0.
55
71
 
0.
44
39
 
0.
48
18
 
0.
76
03
 
0.
33
42
 
T
el
ep
ho
ne
s 
1.
00
00
 
0.
70
67
 
0.
32
18
 
0.
51
76
 
0.
47
76
 
0.
61
99
 
0.
47
80
 
 N
um
be
r 
te
le
ph
on
e 
m
ut
ua
ls 
19
02
  
N
um
be
r 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
m
ut
ua
ls 
19
03
  
N
um
be
r 
da
ir
y 
co
op
er
at
iv
es
 1
91
3 
 
N
um
be
r 
gr
ai
n 
el
ev
at
or
 c
oo
ps
 1
91
3 
N
um
be
r 
m
un
ic
ip
al
 u
til
iti
es
 1
92
2 
N
um
be
r 
st
at
e 
cr
ed
it 
un
io
ns
 1
94
0 
N
um
be
r 
el
ec
tr
ic
al
 c
oo
pe
ra
tiv
es
 1
94
1 
C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 B
et
w
ee
n 
G
eo
gr
ap
hi
ca
l D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 o
f A
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l F
or
m
s 
1420 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1409 
Five decades later, during the 1970s and 1980s, the same increases in 
population stability, ethnic homogeneity, and local associations each re-
duced the odds that a mutual bank would convert to a for-profit corpora-
tion by 15% to 48%.18 These figures confirm historical accounts. Immi-
grants to the United States from Germany and the Nordic countries in the 
late nineteenth century brought with them experiences with cooperatives, 
and templates for collective enterprises that proved easiest to organize—
and sustain—among communities and groups where stability, homogene-
ity, and existing associations fostered enduring networks and a wealth of 
social capital.19 
Cooperatives also received vital support from anticorporate and 
reform movements that fought to establish more local and regionally ba-
lanced, small-stakeholder forms of capitalism in the United States. 20 
These groups included municipal and public ownership leagues, Western 
progressives, and Southern agrarians during the New Deal. They in-
cluded reformer-policymakers who turned repeatedly to mutual savings 
associations to promote prosperous Main Streets and thriving, peaceful, 
and self-sufficient communities of virtuous householders. They also in-
cluded the Grange and the Farmers Alliance—two national movements 
that figured particularly prominently in American cooperativism.21 Both 
movements rejected “corporate liberal” programs of development con-
centrated in corporations, national markets, and a few urban metropolis-
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es. Both sought instead to promote “producer-republican” programs of 
decentralized development and “cooperative commonwealths” of inde-
pendent producers, farmers, regional markets, and self-governing towns. 
To those ends, both fought for antitrust laws, regulation, and cooperative 
and state enterprise. Standard deviation increases in Grange strength dur-
ing its first late nineteenth-century peak boosted the number of coopera-
tives and mutuals into the early twentieth century by 21% to as much as 
154%, net of economic and community factors.22 Moreover, during its 
early twentieth-century revival, increased Grange strength fostered 
broader social orientations and networks of collaboration, which reduced 
the dependence of cooperatives on solidaritistic local communities, help-
ing institutionalize them as general organizing forms.23 
Finally, early organizing successes induced self-sustaining dynam-
ics of organizational interlocking, serving as infrastructures for the sub-
sequent organization of cooperative and related forms in other regions 
and industries. Cooperatives and related forms diffused across states 
within regions, across industries within states, and across related forms.24 
Some of this reflected direct transfers of templates, information, and legi-
timacy, as well as financial support, services, organizational experience, 
and already-formed collectives of cooperators. Yet early successes also 
promoted organizational federation—Wisconsin reinsurance pools, elec-
trical generating and transmission cooperatives, credit union service or-
ganizations, and state grain associations—as well as state and federal 
policies that supported subsequent cooperative and mutual organization. 
During the 1930s and 1940s, for example, the presence of an insurance 
mutual, the presence of a municipal electrical utility, and a one standard 
deviation increase in agricultural cooperatives within a county each 
raised the odds that an electrical cooperative would form there by 13% to 
20%.25 Standard deviation increases in the densities of electrical coopera-
tives already organized elsewhere within and outside the state increased 
those odds, respectively, by as much as 65% and 190%, while being in 
the service area of federal power projects raised the odds of cooperative 
formation by 130% to 160%. Decades later, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
existing communities of cooperatives likewise had preservative effects, 
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reducing the odds that mutual banks would convert to stock corporations 
by 11% to 35%.26 
III. FORMS IN USE: DEVELOPMENT, UPGRADING, AND  
PROBLEM-SOLVING CAPACITIES 
As the organizational demographics just presented show, coopera-
tives and related forms are far more widespread and viable than trium-
phalist accounts of American corporate capitalism generally allow. I now 
trace how actors mobilized these enterprises in particular industries to 
contest corporations and to solve vexing problems of investment and 
economic development. 
Organizations and systems of organizations are infrastructure for 
economic activity. Their structures shape the purposes they serve, the 
identities and aspirations they support, and the kinds of activity, invest-
ment, and development that likely result.27 Structurally, cooperatives and 
related forms eliminate the independent owner–shareholder, unifying 
ownership and sometimes control with the producer or consumer. As 
such, they mitigate conflicts of interest between ownership and produc-
tion or consumption, and shift the purposes and masters served by the 
firm from profit maximization and shareholder value to provision and the 
substantive interests of consumers and producers. In fact, these kinds of 
firms enabled producers, consumers, and state officials to counterbalance 
or bypass corporate combinations, gain access to vital goods and mar-
kets, and do things that corporations were unable or unwilling to do. 
They helped actors make and upgrade markets by fostering new forms of 
competition and inducing investments in services, improvement, and 
capital formation. They created possibilities for asset creation and busi-
ness formation, fostering economic self-sufficiency, small-stakeholder 
capitalism, and more even regional development. And they helped tem-
per predatory behavior and deflect corporations toward public-regarding 
ends, expanding regulatory capacities. 
                                                        
 26. Author’s analyses from an ongoing project, Marc Schneiberg, Purging the Path? Communi-
ty, Organizational Form, and the Fate of Mutual Banking in the United States (Mar. 25, 2011) (un-
published manuscript on file with author). 
 27. The importance of organizational form and an appreciation for the differences between 
corporations, cooperatives, and related types of enterprise unite quite disparate approaches to organi-
zations. See, e.g., Ben-Ner, supra note 3; BERK, supra note 1; ELISABETH S. CLEMENS, THE 
PEOPLE’S LOBBY: ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1890–1925 (1997); MICHAEL T. HANNAN, LÁSZLÓ PÓLOS & GLENN R. 
CARROLL, LOGICS OF ORGANIZATION THEORY: AUDIENCES, CODES, AND ECOLOGIES (2007); 
HANSMANN, supra note 3; JOYCE ROTHSCHILD & J. ALLEN WHITT, THE COOPERATIVE 
WORKPLACE: POTENTIALS AND DILEMMAS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 
(1986); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Gilson & 
Mnookin, supra note 3; Haveman & Rao, supra note 20; Ingram & Simons, supra note 3. 
2011] Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism? 1423 
A. Cooperatives in Agriculture 
Cooperatives in grain were key organizational weapons in growers’ 
struggles with railroads and others over the control of distribution and 
the fruits and contours of American economic development.28 During the 
late nineteenth century, grain growers organized cooperatives in response 
to “line elevator” companies that concentrated and then dominated the 
“river of grain” that terminated in Chicago and a few other urban ex-
changes. Line elevator companies were syndicates of commission firms, 
grain dealers, and exporters that monopolized distribution along railroad 
lines. They owned up to 800 or 900 elevators, were densely interlocked 
with railroads and terminal elevators through shared directorates and 
ownership ties, and received notoriously favorable terms from railroads 
and terminal warehouses. With these and other advantages, line elevator 
companies worked ruthlessly to eliminate, acquire, and coerce indepen-
dent elevators into submission, paying farmers high rates for grain in 
places where competition existed, and low rates where it did not. Line 
companies also infuriated growers by docking them for mixtures of 
grain, requiring bushels over legal weight standards, imposing high han-
dling charges, paying growers for lower grade grain that was then re-
sorted and sold as higher grain, and taking advantage of storage facilities 
to withhold or smooth shipments during gluts and famines. 
Growers broke the squeeze by combining cooperative enterprise 
with political attacks against the “elevator trust.” Through cooperatives, 
growers collectively integrated forward along the chain. Grain elevator 
cooperatives were local associations that built elevators; purchased, 
sorted, graded, and stored grain for farmer-members; and then shipped it 
to terminal markets for storage or sale to commission merchants. Grain 
farmers likewise formed state associations, terminal marketing agencies, 
and regional elevators, and even pursued cooperative exchanges and 
wheat pools in an effort to bypass commission houses entirely. To sup-
port these efforts, growers also organized politically. They sought laws 
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that forced railroads to provide sites for elevators; filed antitrust suits in 
Kansas and Nebraska that put grain dealers in jail; pushed for antidiscri-
mination measures that made it harder for line elevators to overbid for 
members’ business; and advocated for a 1906 Interstate Commerce 
Commission investigation that ended railroad opposition to the farmers’ 
elevator movement. 
Unlike dairy farmers, grain growers failed to extend cooperativism 
beyond elevators to create broad systems of market control through co-
operative exchanges and wheat pools.29 But forward integration and self-
organization via elevator cooperatives were quite successful, reducing 
farmer dependence on corporate combinations, and letting growers and 
their local economies capture more of the fruits of economic develop-
ment in agriculture. Elevator cooperatives broke line elevator company 
monopolies, eliminated handling costs, and let growers exploit the bene-
fits of sorting, grading, and smoothing that otherwise would have flowed, 
along with capital, to distant urban centers. 
Dairy farmers also combined cooperative self-organization with 
politics to contest corporations and secure for themselves the conditions 
and fruits of economic development.30 Part of the problem dairy farmers 
faced was that markets and for-profit corporations under-produced key 
“goods” and created too few incentives for investments in quality. At 
first, markets simply under-produced butter and cheese factories, leaving 
farmers seeking manufacturing facilities to their own cooperative devic-
es. For-profit factories and cream “centralizers” subsequently appeared, 
but prior to the Babcock test, they could not reliably discern fat content 
in milk and thus paid one price for all milk grades. Through such practic-
es, farmers felt for-profit businesses discriminated unfairly between qual-
ity producers and those who watered milk, effectively appropriating in-
vestments farmers made in feed, animal care, and equipment to produce 
high-fat milk. In contrast, the central problem for fluid milk producers 
was dependency and concentration in milk distribution. City milk dealers 
who colluded to cut prices created monopolies in urban markets, placing 
farmers at the mercy of “the milk trust.” Dairy farmers were acutely vul-
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nerable in this transaction as seasonal surpluses and the perishable nature 
of milk made it impossible for farmers to strategically withhold their 
produce. 
Creamery and cheese cooperatives helped restore incentives for im-
provement, enabling dairymen processors to monitor their own inputs 
collectively and capture gains from investments in higher-quality produc-
tion. Yet as, if not more important, were milk marketing cooperatives—
which enabled fluid milk producers to counterbalance and bargain col-
lectively with city milk dealers—and their incorporation into regulatory 
systems of milk marketing orders and income supports during the New 
Deal. Here too, cooperatives let farmers and their local economies cap-
ture gains from agricultural development. They served as weapons 
against economic centralization, mechanisms for supporting investments 
in production and quality, and as infrastructures for the development of 
the diverse, mixed-industry regional economies rich in social capital so 
often noted in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and elsewhere. Moreover, as the 
dairy case demonstrates, cooperatives and their federations can also op-
erate as infrastructures for sustaining smaller-scale agriculture. 
B. Mutuals in Finance and Insurance 
Mutuals in the FIRE industries likewise served as weapons against 
corporate combinations and as tools for doing what markets and for-
profit corporations would not or could not do. In mortgage banking, the 
basic problems were under-provision, market creation, and capital forma-
tion to support the “middling sorts.” For-profit commercial banks were 
unwilling to extend long-term loans to working- and middle-class fami-
lies. These families could not trust their hard-earned savings to distant 
associations of stockholders with incentives to take risks with “other 
people’s money.” 
Mutual savings and loans (and community banks) supported the 
making of mortgage markets in two ways.31 As local depositor-owned 
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banking associations, mutual savings and loans created communities of 
fate between depositors, managers, and borrowers: they linked partici-
pants’ welfare in ways that gave each group incentives to take others’ 
interests into account when making economic decisions. On the input 
side, mutual savings and loans helped solve problems of capital forma-
tion by eliminating the independent stockholder. They mitigated incen-
tives for firms to pursue risky, high-yield investments at depositors’ ex-
pense, while enabling depositors to monitor and oblige coresident man-
agers to make prudent investment decisions. These features were particu-
larly important for inducing savings in the absence of deposit insurance. 
On the output side, mutual savings and loans helped solve problems of 
lending. They were formed by and for working- and middle-class citi-
zens to pool their resources to lend among themselves. Moreover, since 
mutuals were local associations, prospective borrowers were often per-
sonally known to managers and other depositors, affording mutuals 
unique abilities to assess lending risk, oblige borrowers to fulfill their 
promises, and work out problems. 
Their recent history notwithstanding, mutual savings associations 
were, in general, quite successful institutions. They were the vehicles for 
making mortgage markets, supporting both capital formation and asset 
creation among the working and middle classes, and the prosperity of 
local communities. Furthermore, as federal policymakers mobilized mu-
tuals to make markets during and after the New Deal, they effectively 
mixed federal initiative and support with local, voluntary organization, 
demonstrating possibilities for regulating markets without statism or the 
creation of a national system of local bureaucracies. 
Insurance mutuals were also built into regulatory architectures and 
accomplished things that for-profit stock corporations could not or would 
not do. But insurance mutuals arose from somewhat different roots than 
mutual savings and loan associations, and were blended with regulation 
in a very different way.32 Business, commercial groups, and farmers or-
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ganized insurance mutuals to deal with two sets of problems posed by 
corporations in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century property in-
surance markets. 
First, consumers faced the classic problem of the “insurance trust.” 
Stock insurance companies made money from investments rather than 
insurance, and competed for premiums in densely populated and high-
value urban and commercial markets to fund their investment programs. 
As a result, stock insurers often underserved farms, small businesses, and 
individuals in less densely populated regions in the West, Midwest, and 
South. This proved devastating to the interests of businesses, industries, 
and farms that could not secure credit without insurance. Moreover, as 
they scrambled for premiums, stock insurers consistently failed to pool 
loss data or accumulate reserves, which eroded their capacity to pay 
claims and left policyholders unprotected after conflagrations. Insurers 
tempered rivalry via rate-making cartels. But corporations used their as-
sociations to subject policyholders to rate discrimination and across-the-
board rate hikes, in which corporations taxed town-and-country interests 
across regions to fund their commitments in Midwestern and Eastern 
metropolises. 
Second, stock insurers and their cartels steadfastly refused to invest 
or collaborate with consumers or state officials in creating fire-
prevention systems. Stock corporations reckoned their insurance opera-
tions in terms of loss ratios (the ratios of losses paid to premiums col-
lected), and were utterly indifferent to the level of losses, or the “burning 
rate,” so long as they could adjust premium rates to maintain favorable 
ratios. Stock corporations even faced disincentives to invest in preven-
tion because such investments have collective good and consumer-
specific properties. Nothing prevented consumers who received specia-
lized consultations, materials, and technical support from one insurance 
company from simply switching insurers and expropriating that firm’s 
investments when it tried to raise rates to cover those costs. And since 
stock firms were reluctant to meet consumers’ loss-reduction efforts with 
lower rates, consumers were likewise unable to capitalize on investments 
in prevention, creating further disincentives for such investments.33 
Property owners dealt with both sets of issues by organizing their 
own insurance mutuals, coupling economic self-organization with politi-
cal programs of antitrust and regulation. As mechanisms of risk pooling, 
or collective self-supply, mutuals helped solve the problem of under-
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provision—particularly when they federated into broader reinsurance and 
rating pools. Mutuals also let consumers bypass stock corporations and 
their cartels, sometimes entirely, eliminating excess charges and com-
mission costs, and providing coverage at substantially lower rates. In 
fact, the appearance of mutuals acted both to induce stock corporations to 
enter underserved lines and regions, and to draw business from cartel 
members, simultaneously expanding insurance markets and increasing 
competition in key lines. In addition, the unification of consumption with 
ownership within mutuals aligned incentives for investments in loss re-
duction, prevention, and improvement. This began with “mill mutuals,” 
which developed specialized engineering, inspection, and research facili-
ties; worked closely with factories to redesign plant layouts and 
processes; and developed a steady stream of new prevention protocols 
and technologies, including lead plug pressurized sprinkler systems and 
wired glass. The form quickly spread across lines and regions. As mu-
tuals spread, they introduced a new form of competition into the busi-
ness, forcing stock corporations to follow suit, and dramatically upgrad-
ing insurance markets. 
These lessons were not lost on insurance commissioners, who spent 
much of the Progressive era crafting rate regulatory systems that took 
advantage of rate-making associations while simultaneously subjecting 
them to public oversight. At the heart of this regime was a set of admin-
istrative mechanisms for authoring associations, reviewing rates and as-
sociational practices, hearing grievances, and making rate orders. These 
administrative controls were designed to ensure two things: (1) that rates 
were proportional to losses in order to prevent excess prices; and (2) that 
loss ratios exhibited parity across risks, places, and lines in order to pre-
vent unfair discrimination. Yet the architects of rate regulation in the 
states also saw the benefit in putting steady downward pressure on losses 
and loss costs in such a system. Reduced losses were clearly in the public 
interest and would yield gradually decreasing rates. Accordingly, legisla-
tors combined the standard administrative controls over the market with 
measures that promoted mutual alternatives in the market. This institu-
tionalized the new competition, put additional pressures on stock corpo-
rations, and enhanced states’ regulatory capacities.34 
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C. Public and Cooperative Power 
Consumer groups organized electrical cooperatives to resolve the 
remarkable failure of IOUs to connect and provide power to millions of 
rural households. In fact, electrical cooperatives served as an infrastruc-
ture for one of the largest development programs in the mid-twentieth-
century American economy. 
The electrical utility industry and IOUs were the railroads of the 
mid-twentieth century in a critical sense. Electrical utilities produced a 
good that was sufficiently essential for industry, commerce, and general 
economic activity—its absence virtually precluded economic develop-
ment—that the shape of its provision helped define development’s geo-
graphical and social contours. Moreover, as the Great Depression made 
dramatically clear, private provision of electricity though corporations 
left the vast majority of the American landmass without power, leading 
to astonishing rural underdevelopment in the middle, south, and west of 
the country. Electrification rates outside major cities in 1934 were re-
markably low, even in relatively prosperous mixed-economy states like 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Oregon, where only 21.4%, 19.6%, and 
27.5%, respectively, of farmers were connected to the grid.35 In the 
Plains states, Mountain West, and South, the situation was far more dire. 
In the Dakotas and Wyoming, 3% or less of farms were powered; in 
Texas and Oklahoma, only 2.3% and 2.6%; in Alabama, Georgia, and 
Kentucky it was 4%, 2.8%, and 3%; and in Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi, only 1.2%, 1.7%, and 0.9% of farms were linked to this crit-
ical component of modernity. 
Fearful that such radical deprivation would fuel massive internal 
dislocation and even fascism, New Dealers eventually turned to coopera-
tives to address the problem of electrification. They worked through both 
the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) and development clusters 
centered on federal power projects.36 The rural electrification plan was, 
at first, mainly a loan program. The REA originally offered IOUs low 
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interest loans for building transmission and distribution networks that 
would connect rural America to the grid. Borrowers would receive the 
utility franchise for selling power to the millions of new customers that 
would result. They would also receive the right to use the receipts from 
those power sales as both collateral and the means of paying off what 
amounted to self-liquidating loans. When IOUs refused its loan offers, 
the REA turned to cooperative organization. It invited rural communities 
across the country to form local cooperatives to take advantage of the 
program. In addition, it provided those cooperatives with organizational 
plans, educational services, and political cover, as well as the technical 
support needed for constructing, connecting, and energizing power lines. 
Cooperatives also received key support from state-owned power 
companies, including both municipal electrical utilities and giant federal 
hydroelectric power projects like the TVA and Bonneville. Three fea-
tures made the federal projects the basis of what amounted to regional 
development clusters. First, they were sources of inexpensive hydroelec-
tric power. Second, they opted for flat-rate policies instead of pricing in 
proportion to distance, supporting regional development rather than the 
concentration of large power users near the dams. Lastly, they served as 
incubators for cooperatives by advocating the cooperative form to com-
munities in their service areas, by providing organizational and technical 
support, and by granting them preference in the sales of low-cost power. 
The organization of cooperatives and their blending with public in-
itiatives and enterprise proved remarkably successful on a number of 
levels. First, cooperatives connected millions of consumers in relatively 
sparsely populated sections of the country, thereby absorbing the risks of 
undertaking widespread electrification. They even induced power gene-
rating IOUs to enter wholesale trade in these regions. Cooperatives thus 
substantially expanded electricity markets and made a truly national 
power network possible for the first time. Indeed, cooperatives in elec-
tricity played a similar role to telephone mutuals’ role in their industry at 
the beginning of the twentieth century.37 They interconnected widely 
dispersed but unserved consumers in relatively sparsely populated re-
gions, laying the foundation for national networks once they were linked 
with trunklines and power grids in urban centers. 
Cooperatives were also successful both in promoting the develop-
ment of the Tennessee Valley states and the vibrant, mixed-economy 
region of the Pacific Northwest, and, more generally, in electrifying and 
modernizing rural America. By 1950, rural areas that fifteen years earlier 
                                                        
 37. See POWELL, supra note 6, at 299–307; Barnett & Carroll, supra note 12; Fischer, supra 
note 12. 
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had 5% or fewer of their farms connected to the grid were nearly com-
pletely integrated. This fueled the modernization of farm households, 
widespread mechanization of farming, and the introduction of technolo-
gy in farm homes that actually reduced the hours women devoted to do-
mestic labor. In Arkansas, Alabama, and Iowa, 82.8%, 88.5%, and 
95.5% of farms were plugged in, respectively.38 Even the two least-
electrified states had made dramatic progress. In Mississippi and Okla-
homa, 57.6% and 67.7% of farmers were electrified, respectively, indi-
cating 30–60 fold increases and a quite substantially raised floor. 
Finally, cooperatives in electricity provided perhaps the most dra-
matic demonstration of the potential for combining strategies of organi-
zation diversity with other more commonly understood strategies for 
contesting corporations, reforming capitalism, and fostering market de-
velopment. The REA and federal power projects experienced withering 
attacks for what their critics denounced as socialism and rampant statism. 
In response, they deliberately and consciously combined federal regula-
tion, sponsorship, and enterprise with private, voluntary self-organization 
via cooperatives as a means to undertake massive federal intervention 
without creating a correspondingly massive system of direct local admin-
istration. Like the analyses of finance and insurance above, this case 
study also reveals possibilities for using cooperatives and related forms 
to expand and upgrade regulatory capacities. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
With good reason, current discussions of economic reform focus on 
the corporation, looking to competition policies and countervailing pow-
er as means to remedy current ills. Historically, reformers saw the state, 
unions, regulation, and antitrust as the critical counterweights to corpora-
tions. More recently, this task has fallen to NGO watchdogs and certifi-
cation, privatization, and corporate governance reform. The goal in the 
current period is to harness the “market forces” of shareholder activism, 
institutional investors, and informed consumer choice to discipline cor-
porations, upgrade markets, and discourage low-road development. 
This Article offers an argument for a third strategy: fostering alter-
natives to the corporation through the development of parallel, comple-
mentary, or competing systems of cooperative, mutual, and local, state-
owned enterprise. These alternatives are typically dismissed as side-
shows or relics of a bygone era. Yet, as the historical record shows, co-
operatives, mutuals, and local state enterprises emerged, prospered, and 
                                                        
 38. RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN., REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE RURAL 
ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION 1950 (1951). 
1432 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:1409 
operate today in surprisingly large numbers in a wide range of industries. 
Organizationally mixed systems have served, and continue to serve, as 
mechanisms for a variety of thoroughly modern projects: making and 
upgrading markets; supporting investments in quality and improvement; 
fostering new forms of competition, capital formation, and asset creation; 
and promoting more balanced local and regional development. They con-
tinue to serve as vehicles for bypassing, disciplining, and reforming cor-
porations, and they help harness corporations to more public ends. Fur-
thermore, mixed systems have been creatively built into regulatory archi-
tectures, broadening the possibilities for intervention, as well as enhanc-
ing states’ capacities to shape markets and corporate behavior without 
relying exclusively on direct bureaucratic control or creating extensive 
local administrative systems. Such combinatorial possibilities could be 
particularly important in the current period. 
The historical focus of this Article begs the question of how such 
strategies could be pursued in the current crisis. Yet posing the question 
too strongly in those terms may reproduce the periodization this Article 
seeks to overturn, potentially missing the point that cooperative and re-
lated forms not only persist today, but also are already serving as partial 
solutions to ills associated with corporate capitalism. We may look with 
nostalgia and embarrassment at those food co-ops of the 1960s and 
1970s. Yet existing food systems based on giant, for-profit corporate 
processors are not immune to criticisms that they poison us with 
processed foods or are unnecessarily cruel to animals. Food cooperatives 
were the platforms for introducing organic and whole foods into the 
market.39 Moreover, they are currently part of increasingly dense and 
correlated ecologies of farmers’ markets, community supported agricul-
ture programs, co-ops, and elite local food restaurants, providing at least 
some leverage for pushing corporate chains like Fred Meyer and Wal-
mart to prominently feature organic and local foods in their aisles. 
We may likewise view municipal utilities with concerns about cor-
ruption and waste, looking wistfully to the private sector in the rush to 
deregulate and privatize. Yet municipal utilities in Los Angeles and 
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elsewhere in California not only retained their own power-generating 
facilities, but also pursued extensive modernization plans. Moreover, 
these municipals were able both to serve their customers without raising 
prices during the California energy crisis and sell power on the grid at a 
profit, suggesting potentially substantial gains from diversifying organi-
zationally and promoting buffering, decentralization, and redundancy 
through parallel systems of enterprise.40 
Moreover, community banks, mutuals, and credit unions may be 
dismissed as thinking too small in discussions of how to solve the global 
financial crisis. Yet they are vehicles for instituting more local and de-
centralized forms of economic order, and are likewise available as alter-
natives or complements to more conventional regulatory strategies. 
Community banks and credit unions are less subject to pressures to max-
imize shareholder value than commercial banks. They too pursued in-
vestments in mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, 
and other derivatives, but far less aggressively than bank corporations. 
They are far more rooted in their communities, affinity groups, and local 
constituencies. They are much more oriented to serving members and 
clients than making a business of subjecting them to an endless stream of 
fees and charges. And they appear better situated to do workouts for 
homeowners who are underwater.41 Like electrical municipals and coop-
eratives in other sectors, community banks and credit unions stand as an 
alternative or redundant organizational system, one that can partially buf-
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fer some of the economy from the collapse of for-profit finance, while 
providing governments with alternative pathways for recapitalizing 
banking, restoring flows of credit, and aiding distressed households. We 
can only imagine how these systems would respond to the kinds of funds 
the federal government poured into the commercial banking sector. But 
there is good reason to believe that these organizations would behave 
differently, making them a reasonable place to hedge regulatory bets in 
financial reform. 
